Précis of "Vagueness"

The central thesis of the book is that the proposition a vague sentence expresses in a borderline case is true or false, and we cannot know which. We are ignorant of its truth-value. This is the epistemic view of vagueness. It allows us to preserve both classical logic and disquotational principles about truth and falsity, with all their advantages: simplicity, clarity, power, past success, integration with well-confirmed theories in other domains. Consequently, the epistemic view has a head start over its rivals. The gap is widened by each rival theory's specific disadvantages, many of them related to higher-order vagueness. The epistemic view is then strengthened by an explanation of our ignorance in borderline cases. The explanation predicts higher order vagueness.The full-text of this article is not currently available in ORA, but you may be able to access the article via the publisher copy link on this record page. Citation: Williamson, T. (1997). 'Précis of 'Vagueness'', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57(4), 921-928. N.B. Prof Williamson is now based at the Faculty of Philosophy, University of Oxford